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Abstract
There are two senses of ‘what scientists know’: An individual sense
in which scientists report their own opinions, and a collective sense in
which one reports the state of the discipline. The latter is what is of in-
terest for the purpose of policy and planning. Yet an expert, although
she can report the former directly (her opinion on some question),
can only report her considered opinion of the latter (the community
opinion on the question). Formal judgement aggregation functions
offer more rigorous frameworks for assessing the community opinion.
They take the individual judgements of experts as inputs and yield a
collective judgement as an output. This paper argues that scientific
opinion is not effectively captured by a function of this kind. In order
to yield consistent results, the function must take into account the
inferential relationships between different judgements. Yet the infer-
ential relationships are themselves matters to be judged by experts
involving risks which must be weighed, and the significance of the risk
depends on value judgements.
In one sense, ‘what scientists know’ just means the claims which are the
determination of our best science. Yet science is a collective enterprise; there
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are many scientists who have individual and disparate beliefs. So ‘what scien-
tists know’, in another sense, means the omnibus comprised of the epistemic
state of scientist #1, the epistemic state of scientist #2, and so on for the
rest of the community. The phrase is ambiguous between a collective and an
individual meaning.
If we consult a scientific expert, either because we want to plan policy
or just because we are curious, we are typically interested in the collective
sense. We want to know what our best present science has to say about
the matter. And the expert we consult can differentiate the two senses, too.
She can relate what she as a particular scientists knows (what she herself
thinks, where here sympathies lie in controversies, and so on), but she can
also take a step back from those commitments to give her sense of what the
community consensus or dominant opinion is on the same matters. If it is
simply curiosity that has led us to consult an expert, this may be enough.
When policy hangs on the judgement, however, we want more than just one
expert’s report on the state of the entire field.
This distinction between their personal commitments and the state of the
field in their discipline is one that any scholar can make. If you think (as
tradition has it) that only individuals can have beliefs in a strict sense, then
take the expression ‘opinion of the scientific community’ as a fac¸on de par-
ler. If you think (as Lynn Hankinson Nelson does [10]) that the community
rather than the individual knows in a strict sense, then suitably reinterpret
‘what an individual knows’ in terms of belief. The distinction I have in mind
is neutral with respect to the metaphysics of social epistemology. The ques-
tion is simply how we could use consultation with individuals to generate a
composite, collective judgement.
Formal judgement aggregation offers rigorous frameworks which seem to
provide what we want. In the abstract, it defines a function that takes
individual scientists’ judgements as inputs and yields collective judgement
as an output. This assumes that the collective judgement of the scientific
community depends on the separate individual judgments of the scientists
— i.e., that what scientists know in the collective sense is a function of what
scientists know in the individual sense.
Taking a recent proposal by Hartmann et al. [6][7] as an exemplar, I argue
that judgement aggregation does a poor job of representing what scientists
know in the collective sense. I survey several difficulties. The deepest stems
from the fact that judgements of fact necessarily involve (perhaps implicit)
value judgements. Where values and risks might be contentious, this entails
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that individual judgements cannot merely be inputs to a function. Judgement
aggregation is not enough.
1 The majority and premise-majority rules
As a judgement aggregation procedure, one might na¨ıvely survey scientists
about factual matters and take any answer given by the majority of scientists
to reflect the state of science. Of course, scientists would agree about a great
many things that are simply not within their purview. Physicists would say
that Sacramento is the capital of California, but that does not make it part
of physics. So the survey should be confined to matters that are properly
scientific. The survey must also include only legitimate scientists and exclude
ignorant rabble. These restrictions are somewhat slippery, but let’s accept
them.
The na¨ıve procedure is a simple function from individual judgements to
an aggregate judgement: Return the judgement endorsed by a majority of
the judges. Call this the majority rule.
The majority rule has the nice features that it treats every judge equally
and that it does not bias the conclusion toward one judgement or another.
Yet it suffers from what’s called the discursive dilemma: It can lead to incon-
sistent collective judgements, even if all the judges considered individually
have consistent beliefs. In the following schematic example, there are three
judges: Alice, Bob, and Charles. Each has the consistent beliefs on the mat-
ters P , Q, and (P&Q) indicated in the table below. The majority rule yields
the inconsistent combination of affirming P and Q but denying (P&Q).
P Q (P&Q)
Alice T F F
Bob F T F
Charles T T T
majority T T F
The nice features of majority rule seem like desiderata for a judgement
aggregation rule, but avoiding the discursive dilemma is another such desider-
atum. A good deal of ink has been spilled specifying precisely the desiderata
and proving that they are together inconsistent. However, even where it can
be proven that a set of desiderata cannot be satisfied in all cases, they may
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still be jointly satisfied in some instances. The majority rule can lead to con-
tradiction, it does not do so in every case. As a practical matter, we might
begin by trying out a simple rule (like majority) and add sophistication only
if the actual community has judgements like those in schematic example.1
Even so, more sophisticated rules would be needed for corner cases.
Stephan Hartmann, Gabriella Pigozzi, and Jan Sprenger [6][7] develop
a judgement aggregation rule specifically to escape the discursive dilemma.
Their procedure involves polling judges only regarding matters of indepen-
dent evidence. For matters which are consequences of the evidence, the
procedure derives consequences from the aggregated judgements. In the sim-
ple case given in the table above, for example, the procedure would affirm P
and Q (because each is affirmed by a majority) and also P&Q (because it
is a consequence of P and Q). Call this the premise-majority rule. When it
can be applied, premise-majority generates a consistent set of judgements.
There are several difficulties with premise-majority, as a way of aggregat-
ing expert scientific opinion.2
First, premise-majority inevitably produces some determinate answer. As
Brams et al. [3] show, it is possible for a combination of separate elections
to result in an overall outcome that would not be affirmed by any of the
voters. Moreover, a judge’s inconsistency will necessarily be between some
belief about evidence and some belief about the consequences of the evidence
— since the evidence claims are stipulated to be independent — but premise-
majority does not query their beliefs about consequences at all. So it will
generate a consistent set of judgements even if many or all judges are in-
consistent. As such, premise-majority will generate determinate results even
when the community is confused or fractured into competing camps. But,
in considering scientific opinion, we certainly only want to say that there is
something ‘scientists know’ when there is a coherent scientific community.
Second, applying the rule requires a division between the judgements that
are evidence and the ones that are conclusions. As Fabrizio Cariana notes,
premise-majority “requires us to isolate, for each issue, a distinguished set
1The strategy of adding complications only as necessary can be applied generally to
decision problems. For example, intransitive preferences wreck dominance reasoning. Yet
one might presumptively employ dominance reasoning until one actually faces a case where
there are intransitive preferences.
2Since Hartmann et al. are thinking about the general problem of judgement aggrega-
tion, rather than the problem of expert elicitation, these are objections to the application
of the rule rather than to the rule as such.
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of logically independent premises” [4, p. 28]. He constructs a case involving
three separate, contentious claims and an agreed upon constraint, such that
any two of the three claims logically determines the third. It would be arbi-
trary to treat two of the claims as evidence (and so suitable for polling) and
the third as a consequence (and so fixed by inference). The premise-majority
rule simply is not applicable in cases where the line between premises and
conclusions is so fluid. This difficulty leads Cariani to conclude only that
premise-majority will sometimes be inapplicable; so he suggests, “Different
specific aggregation problems may call for different aggregation rules” [4,
p. 29]. Yet the problem is especially acute for scientific judgement, because
inference can be parsed at different levels. Individual measurements like ‘35◦
at 1:07 AM’ are not the sort of thing that would appear in a scientific pub-
lication; individual data points are unrepeatable and not something about
which you would query the whole community. Yet they do, of course, play
a roˆle in inference. At the same time, scientists may take things like the
constancy of the speed of light to be evidence for a theory; the evidence here
is itself an inference from experiments and observations. There are different
labels for these different levels. Trevor Pinch [12] calls them observations
of differing externality. James Bogen and James Woodward [2] distinguish
data from phenomena. Since we might treat the same claims as premises or
conclusions, in different contexts, it is unclear what we would poll scientists
about if we applied premise-majority.
Third, premise-majority is constructed for cases where the conclusion is
a deductive consequence of the premises. In science, this is almost never the
case.3 Scientific inference is ampliative, and there is uncertainty not only
about which evidence statements to accept but also about which inferences
ought to be made on their basis. One might avoid this difficulty by including
inferential relations among the evidential judgements. To take a schematic
case, judges could be asked about R and (R → S); if the majority affirms
both, then premise-majority yields an affirmative judgement for S.
One might worry that this suggestion treats ampliative, scientific infer-
ence too much like deductive consequence. The worry is that actual scientists
might accept a premise of the form ‘If R, then typically S’ but nothing so
strong as R → S. It is possible for inferences based on weaker conditionals
3I say ‘almost’ because sufficiently strong background commitments can transform an
ampliative inference into a deduction from phenomena. Of course, we accept equivalent
inductive risk when we adopt the background commitments; cf. [9].
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about what is merely typical to lead from consistent premises to inconsistent
conclusions. To answer the worry, one might appeal to what John Norton
[11] calls a material theory of induction. The central idea is that most of
inductive risk in ampliative inferences is shouldered by conditional premises;
Norton calls the premises material postulates. So — in answer to the worry
— one might think that asking about material postulates would allow us to
use the premise-majority rule to aggregate scientific judgements about many
even though not absolutely all matters.
A deeper problem with the suggestion is that it presumes that scientists
can say, independently of everything else, whether the inference from R to S
is appropriate. That is, it assumes that material postulates can be evaluated
on a ballot separately from everything else. In the remainder of the paper, I
argue that this idealizes science too much. Whether a scientific inference is
appropriate must be informed by more than just the particular evidence —
the appropriate scientific conclusion depends (at least in some cases) on the
risks and values involved.
In the next section, I spell out more clearly the way in which inference
can be entangled with values and risk. In the subsequent section, I return to
it as a problem for premise-majority. As we’ll see, it becomes a problem for
more than just Hartmann et al.’s specific proposal. It is a problem for any
formal judgement aggregation rule whatsoever.
2 The James-Rudner-Douglas thesis
Here is a quick argument for the entanglement of judgement and values:
There is a tension between different epistemic duties. The appropriate bal-
ance between these duties is a matter of value commitments rather than a
matter of transcendent rationality. So making a judgement of fact necessarily
depends on value commitments.
The argument goes back at least to William James, who puts the point
this way: “We must know the truth; and we must avoid error — these are
our first and great commandments as would-be knowers; but they are not
two ways of stating an identical commandment, they are two separable laws”
[8, p. 99]. Although James has in mind personal matters of conscience (such
as religious belief), Richard Rudner makes a similar argument for scientific
judgement. Rudner argues that
the scientist must make the decision that the evidence is suf-
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ficiently strong. . . to warrant the acceptance of the hypothesis.
Obviously our decision regarding the evidence and respecting how
strong is “strong enough”, is going to be a function of the im-
portance, in the typically ethical sense, of making a mistake in
accepting or rejecting the hypothesis. [13, p. 2]
There is not only a tension between finding truth and avoiding error, but
also between risking one kind of error and risking another. Any particular
test involves a trade-off between making the standards too permissive (and
so mistakenly giving a positive answer) or making them too strict (and so
mistakenly giving a negative answer). The former mistake is a false positive
or type I error; the latter a false negative or type II error. There is an
inevitable tradeoff between the risk of each mistake, and so there is a point
at which the only way to reduce the risk of both is to collect more evidence
and perform more tests. Yet the decision to do so is itself a practical as
well as an epistemic decision. In any case, it leaves the realm of judgement
aggregation — having more evidence would mean having different science,
rather than discerning the best answer our present science has to a question.
As such, values come into play. Heather Douglas puts the point this way,
“Within the parameters of available resources and methods, some choices
must be made, and that choice should weigh the costs of false positives versus
false negatives. Weighing these costs legitimately involves social, ethical, and
cognitive values” [5, p. 104].
Plotting a curve through these 19th, 20th, and 21st-century formulations,
call this the James-Rudner-Douglas or JRD thesis : Anytime a scientist an-
nounces a judgement of fact, they are making a tradeoff between the risk of
different kinds of error. This balancing act depends on the costs of each kind
of error, so scientific judgement involves assessments of the value of different
outcomes.
The standard objection to the thesis is that responsible scientists should
not be making categorical judgements. They should never simply announce
‘P ’ (the objection says) but instead should say things like ‘The available
evidence justifies x% confidence in P .’ This response fails to undercut the
thesis, because procedures for assigning confidence levels also involve a bal-
ance between different kinds of risk. This is clearest if the confidence is given
as an interval, like x±e%. Error can be avoided, at the cost of precision, by
making e very large. Yet a tremendous interval, although safe, is tantamount
to no answer at all.
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Eric Winsberg and Justin Biddle [1] give a substantially more subtle reply
to the standard objection. Regarding the specific case of climate modeling,
Winsberg and Biddle show that scientists’ estimates both of particular quan-
tities and of confidence intervals depend on the histories of their models. For
example, the results are different if scientists model ocean dynamics and
then add a module for ice formation rather than vice-versa. The history of a
model reflects decisions about what was considered to be important enough
to model first, and so it depends on prior value judgements.
But why should the JRD thesis have consequences for expert elicitation?
After all, James does not apply it to empirical scientific matters. He is
concerned with religious and personal matters, and he concludes merely that
we should “respect one another’s mental freedom” [8, p. 109]. He does not
apply it at all scientific matters where there is a community of legitimate
experts.
Rudner, who does apply the thesis to empirical judgements, nevertheless
hopes that the requisite values might themselves be objective. What we need,
he concludes, is “a science of ethics” [13, p. 6]. Rudner calls this a “task of
stupendous magnitude” [13, p. 6], but he is too optimistic. Searching for an
objective ethics in order to resolve the weight of values and risks is a fool’s
errand. A regress would ensue: The judgements of ethical science would
need to be informed by the ethically correct values so as to properly balance
inductive risks, but assurance that we have the correct values would only be
available as the product of ethical science. One might invoke pragmatism
and reflective equilibrium, but such invocations would not give Rudner final
or utterly objective values. If responsible judgement aggregation were to wait
on an utterly objective, scientific ethics, then it would wait forever.
Douglas accepts that the thesis matters for expert elicitation. So she
considers the concrete question of how to determine the importance of the
relevant dangers. She argues for an analytic-deliberative process which would
include both scientists and stakeholders [5, ch. 8]. Such a process is required
when the scientific question has a bearing on public policy, and there are
further conditions which must obtain in order for such processes to be suc-
cessful. For one, “policymakers [must be] fully committed to taking seriously
the public input and advice they receive and to be guided by the results of
such deliberation” [5, p. 166]. For another, the public must be “engaged
and manageable in size, so that stakeholders can be identified and involved”
[5, p. 166]. Where there are too many stakeholders and scientists for di-
rect interaction, there can still be vigorous public examination of the values
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involved. Rather than pretending that there is any all-purpose procedure,
Douglas calls for “experiment with social mechanisms to achieve a robust
dialog and potential consensus about values” [5, p. 169]. Where consensus
is impossible, we can still try to elucidate and narrow the range of options.
Douglas’ approach is both a matter of policy (trying to increase trust in
science, rather than alienating policymakers and stakeholders) and a matter
of normative politics (claiming that stakeholders’ values are ones that sci-
entists should take into consideration). In cases where these concerns are
salient, saying what scientists know will depend on more than just the prior
isolated judgements of scientists — but moreover on facts about the actual
communities of scientists, policymakers, and stakeholders.
Arguably, Douglas’ concerns will not be salient in all cases. Some science
is far removed from questions of policy. So the significance of the JRD thesis
may depend on the question being asked.
3 Our fallible selves
I argued above that the premise-majority rule was inapplicable in many sci-
entific contexts because it only worked for cases of deductive consequence.
Formally, this worry could be resolved by asking scientists about which in-
ferences would be justified; we poll them about claims like (E → H) at the
same time as we poll them about E. The JRD thesis undercuts this formal
trick. Where the judgement has consequences, the inference itself is an ac-
tion under uncertainty. So the appropriate inference depends on the values
at stake. Schematically, whether one should assent to (E → H) depends on
the risks involved in inferring H from E. Concretely, questions of science
that matter for policy are not entirely separable from questions of the policy
implications.
If we merely poll scientists, then we will be accepting whatever judge-
ments accord with their unstated values. We instead want the procedure
to reflect the right values, which in a democratic society means including
communities effected by the science. Importantly, this does not mean that
stakeholders get to decide matters of fact themselves; they merely help de-
termine how the risks involved in reaching a judgement should be weighed.
Nor does it mean that politicized scientific questions should be answered by
political means; climate scientists can confidently identify general trends and
connections, even allowing for disagreement about the values involved. What
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it does mean is that scientists cannot provide an account that is value-neutral
in all its precise details.4
This is fatal to premise-majority as a method of determining what sci-
entists know collectively. Moreover, it is fatal to any judgement aggregation
rule that treats judges merely as separate inputs to an algorithm. The prob-
lem extends to practical policies of expert elicitation, insofar as they are
procedures for enacting judgement aggregation rules. Where there are im-
portant values at stake that scientists are not taking into account or where
the value commitments of scientists are different than those of stakehold-
ers, the present judgements of individual scientists can not just be taken as
givens.
An analytic-deliberative process is required, but the appropriate mecha-
nisms are not ones which we can derive a priori. As Douglas argues, we need
to experiment with different possibilities [5, p. 169, cited above]. There is not
likely to be one universally applicable process. It will depend on facts about
the communities involved. Moreover, the inference from social experiments in
deliberation will itself be an inductive inference about a question that effects
policy. So the inference depends importantly on value judgements about the
inductive risks involved, and that means an analytic-deliberative process will
be required. It would be a mistake to hope, in parallel with Rudner’s appeal
to a science of ethics, for an objective set of procedural norms. How best
to resolve meta-level judgement about experiments in social arrangements is
as much a contingent matter as how to socially arrange object-level expert
consultation. We start with the best processes we can muster up now, and
we try to improve them going forward. Minimally, however, we can say that
future improvements should not elide the roˆle of values, as formal judgment
aggregation functions do, but explicitly accommodate it.
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